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CONFUSION IN THE COURT - WISCONSIN'S
HARMLESS ERROR RULE IN CRIMINAL
APPEALS
I. INTRODUCTION
While a criminal defendant has a fundamental right to a
fair trial,' it has been said that he or she is not entitled to a
perfect trial.2 Less-than-perfect criminal trials result from er-
rors committed at the trial level which have been allowed to
stand uncorrected. These errors may implicate federal consti-
tutional rightss or may be of nonconstitutional magnitude.4
When reviewing such allegedly improper trials, appellate
courts must determine whether an error occurred, and if so,
whether the conviction should be affirmed. This latter deter-
mination is made by applying the doctrine of harmless error.
Unfortunately, appellate courts have not approached the
process of reviewing trial court error in a consistent manner.
This has resulted in confusion as to what harmless error rule
should be applied.5 Wisconsin is no exception. At least three
1. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955); Hart v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 371, 395, 249 N.W.2d 810, 820-21 (1977) (citing
Boldt v. State, 72 Wis. 7, 17, 38 N.W. 177 (1888)).
2. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974); Lutwak v. United States, 344
U.S. 604, 619 (1953); Nyberg v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 400, 411, 249 N.W.2d 524, 529
(1977).
3. See, e.g., Rudolph v. State, 78 Wis. 2d 435, 254 N.W.2d 471 (1977) (prosecu-
tion's use of defendant's post-arrest silence in case-in-chief); Reichhoff v. State, 76
Wis. 2d 375, 251 N.W.2d 470 (1970) (repeated use of defendant's post-arrest silence
by prosecution); Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 219 N.W.2d 286 (1974) (admission of
statement in violation of defendant's Miranda rights); Allison v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 14,
214 N.W.2d 437-(1974) (exclusion of evidence in violation of defendant's sixth
amendment right to compel witnesses in one's own behalf).
4. These errors are usually based upon state substantive or procedural law. See,
e.g., State v. Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 280 N.W.2d 725 (1979) (erroneous use of absent-
witness instruction); Simpson v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 494, 266 N.W.2d 270 (1978) (erro-
neous admission of photographs); State v. Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 252 N.W.2d 94
(1977) (erroneous admission of other-conduct evidence); State v. Jennaro, 76 Wis. 2d
499, 251 N.W.2d 800 (1977) (inadmissible hearsay).
5. See Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A
Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15 (1976) (discussing three differ-
ent formulations for determining constitutional harmless error); Saltzburg, The Harm
of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. Rv. 988 (1973) (discussing the various formulations
applied to constitutional and nonconstitutional error, and stating that "[c]haos sur-
rounds the standard for appellate review of errors in criminal proceedings." Id. at
988).
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different approaches are currently advocated by members of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.' This article will review and
evaluate the approach to harmless error formulated by the
United States Supreme Court, and examine how this doctrine
has affected Wisconsin's approach to harmless error. The dif-
ferent tests currently applied in Wisconsin will then be evalu-
ated. The article will conclude by advocating an approach that
would remove the inconsistency found in Wisconsin's current
harmless error doctrine.
II. THE FEDERAL APPROACH
Under the current approach in federal courts, the review-
ing court first determines whether the error is of a constitu-
tional nature. If the error is nonconstitutional, federal courts
usually apply a formulation which first appeared in Kotteakos
v. United States." In Kotteakos, the United States Supreme
Court found prejudicial error in an indictment, trial, and jury
instructions which assumed that one large conspiracy among
multiple defendants had occurred, despite evidence which es-
tablished eight separate conspiracies. The petitioners did not
contend that the evidence, if considered apart from the al-
leged error, would have been insufficient to establish the sepa-
rate conspiracies.9 Rather, they contended that the erroneous
assumption of only one conspiracy prejudiced the entire trial.
The Court considered a harmless error statute adopted by
Congress in 191910 which "was intended to prevent matters
6. See part HI infra.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United
States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. O'Dell,
462 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Carney, 461 F.2d 465 (3d Cirp 1972);
United States v. Achtenberg, 459 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v Straughn,
453 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Crawford, 438 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1971).
8. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
9. Id. at 753.
10. The Act of February 26, 1919, ch. 48, § 269, 40 Stat. 1181 (amended 1949)
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976)) provided:
All [United States] courts shall have the power to grant new trials, in cases
where there has been a trial by jury, for reasons which new trials have usually
been granted in courts of law. On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, or mo-
tion for a new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment
after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to
technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.
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concerned with the mere etiquette of trials and with the for-
malities and minutiae of procedure from touching the merits
of a verdict."11 Applying the statute,12 the Court held the er-
rors to be not harmless. The Court indicated that the inquiry
was not whether the jury reached the correct result, but what
effect the error may reasonably have had on the jury's
deliberations:
[T]he question is not were they right in their judgment, re-
gardless of the error or its effect upon the jury. It is rather
what effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to
have had upon the jury's decision. The crucial thing is the
impact of the thing done wrong on the minds of other men
... in the total setting.
This must take account of what the error meant to them,
not singled out and standing alone, but in relation to all else
that happened....
If when all is said and done, the conviction [sic] is sure
that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very
slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, ex-
cept perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional
norm or a specific command of Congress. But if one can say,
with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened with-
out stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is im-
possible to conclude that substantial rights were not af-
fected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was
enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected
by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself
had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave
doubt, the conviction cannot stand.13
Thus, Kotteakos emphasized the effect of the error on the
jury's deliberations and expressly rejected a harmless error
determination which merely weighed the sufficiency of the re-
maining, untainted evidence. The Court left open the formu-
lation of a different harmless error rule where "the departure
11. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939).
12. See note 10 supra. The present statute provides:
On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court
shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors
or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976).
13. 328 U.S. at 764-65 (citations omitted).
1980]
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was from a constitutional norm or a specific command of
Congress." '14
In Chapman v. California,15 the United States Supreme
Court specifically addressed constitutional error. Applying
California's harmless error rule, the California Supreme Court
had affirmed defendants' convictions despite repeated refer-
ences by the prosecutor to their refusals to testify, and despite
instructions that the jury could draw adverse inferences from
the refusals to testify."' The United States Supreme Court
held that this was a violation of the fifth amendment right to
remain silent made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment, and held that state harmless error rules were in-
applicable to "infractions by the States of federally guaran-
teed rights." 17 The Court then prescribed a federal standard,
binding on the states, for reviewing the effect of constitutional
error. The Court stated that for constitutional error to be held
harmless, "the court must be able to declare a belief that it
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 8 The Chapman
Court rejected any formulation of the harmless error rule that
placed undue emphasis on the remaining, untainted evidence.
Instead, the Court quoted from Fahy v. Connecticut,9 which
had indicated that the proper inquiry was "whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might
have contributed to the conviction."20 Therefore, like the Kot-
teakos standard for nonconstitutional error, the Chapman
standard focuses on the effect of the constitutional error on
the jury's deliberations2 ' with the express additional require-
ment that harmlessness be found beyond a reasonable doubt.
While the Kotteakos approach has enjoyed continuing vi-
tality in Supreme Court decisions,22 the Chapman test for
14. Id. at 764-65.
15. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
16. Id. at 19.
17. Id. at 21. The Chapman Court recognized that all fifty states had adopted
harmless error rules or statutes, but noted that none of them distinguished between
federal constitutional error and violations of state laws or rules. Id. at 22.
18. Id. at 24.
19. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
20. 386 U.S. at 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)).
21. See Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error - A
Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 15, 26 (1976).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976).
[Vol. 63:643
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harmless constitutional error appears to have undergone
change.23 In a series of cases involving violations of a defen-
dant's sixth amendment confrontation rights in joint trials
contrary to the Court's holding in Bruton v. United States,2 4
the Court appears to have modified the emphasis of Chap-
man. In Harrington v. California,23 the Court made repeated
references to Chapman and purported to apply the Chapman
test, but it did not focus on whether the error complained of
had contributed to the conviction. Instead, in a move which
provoked a three-member dissent,2 Justice Douglas' majority
opinion examined the remaining, untainted evidence and de-
termined it to be so overwhelming in favor of conviction that,
unless the Court were to fashion an automatic reversal rule
for constitutional error, the error must be found harmless.2 In
Schneble v. Florida,"' the Court upheld a conviction despite
constitutional error because it found "the independent evi-
dence of guilt . . . so overwhelming ... ."29 Similarly, in
Brown v. United States,"° constitutional error was deemed
harmless because the improperly admitted evidence "was
merely cumulative of other overwhelming and largely uncon-
troverted evidence properly before the jury."3 1 Recently, in
Parker v. Randolf,3 2 the Court cited Harrington and summa-
rized the harmless error rule it had employed in Schneble and
Brown as follows: "In some cases, the properly admitted evi-
dence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of
the codefendant's admission so insignificant by comparison,
23. See Comment, Harmless Error: The Need for a Uniform Standard, 53 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 541, 551 n.51 (1979) (suggesting that inconsistencies in decisions since
Chapman may be attributable to changes in the composition of the Court).
24. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In Bruton, a witness testified that petitioner's codefend-
ant had orally confessed that he and petitioner committed the armed robbery. The
Supreme Court reversed petitioner's conviction because there was a substantial risk
that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating state-
ment in determining petitioner's guilt, which was a violation of the defendant's right
of confrontation secured by the sixth amendment.
25. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
26. Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Marshall, J.).
27. Id. at 254.
28. 405 U.S. 427 (1972).
29. Id. at 431.
30. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
31. Id. at 231.
32. 422 U.S. 62 (1979).
1980]
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that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the introduc-
tion at trial was harmless error." s
Thus, it would appear that the standard for reviewing con-
stitutional error is reasonably well settled based on Harring-
ton, Schneble, Brown and Parker. While both Kotteakos and
Chapman focused on the prejudicial effect of the error com-
plained of, Harrington, Schneble, Brown and Parker appear
to have regressed 4 by redirecting the attention to the suffi-
ciency of the remaining evidence. It would appear that, rather
than focusing solely on the effect of the error itself, the Court
will also examine the properly admitted, untainted evidence
and render the error harmless where that evidence is over-
whelming in favor of guilt.
III. THE WISCONSIN APPROACH
The standard of review in Wisconsin for harmless error is
addressed in numerous cases and has been affected not only
by the federal approach but also by statutory provisions. The
statutes provide that error will be held harmless unless "a
substantial right of the party is affected."3 5 These sources
have resulted in many different formulations of Wisconsin's
harmless error rule, and confusion as to which rule is to be
applied in any given case.
33. Id. at 70-71.
34. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 255, where Justice Brennan, writ-
ing for the dissent, stated that the majority had, in effect, overruled Chapman, "the
very case it purport[ed] to apply."
35. Wis. STAT. § 901.03 (1977), adopted by supreme court order at 59 Wis. 2d R9
(1974) provides:
Rulings on Evidence. (1) EFFECT OF ERRONEOUS RULING. Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substan-
tial right of the party is affected ....
Wis. STAT. § 817.37 (1975), repealed by 1979 Wis. Laws ch. 89, provided:
Judgments; application to reverse or set aside; new trial; revers-
ible errors. No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new trial granted in
any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirection of the
jury, or the improper admission of evidence, or for error as to any matter of
pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which application
is made, after an examination of the entire action or proceeding, it shall appear
that the error complained of has affected the substantial rights of the party




A. The Effect of the Error: State v. Jennaro
State v. Jennaro38 most directly reflects the federal ap-
proach to harmless error. In Jennaro, hearsay testimony, al-
though inadmissible with respect to the petitioner, was admit-
ted in a joint trial to show the guilt of a codefendant.3 7 In
measuring the prejudicial effect of this error, the court re-
viewed the tests for harmless error as follows:
Under Chapman v. California, the United States Su-
preme Court stated that, before a federal constitutional er-
ror can be held harmless, "the court must be able to declare
a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
This standard of Chapman was specifically reaffirmed in
Harrington v. California. Under the Chapman test, it is ap-
parent beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained
of did not contribute to the guilty verdict in respect to Jen-
naro. Under the test apparently applicable to nonconstitu-
tional error, set forth in Kotteakos v. United States, and
recently restated in United States v. Agurs, the error is
equally harmless, because it is clear that the error did not
influence the jury or had only a slight effect.38
This analysis and application confused the federal courts'
clearly bifurcated approach to constitutional and nonconstitu-
tional error: the states are free to formulate their own rules
for determining nonconstitutional error, but are bound by
Chapman and subsequent cases interpreting Chapman in de-
termining the effect of constitutional error.3 9 The court also
ignored Harrington's emphasis on examining the remaining,
untainted evidence to determine harmlessness. 40 More impor-
tantly, by finding the error before it to be harmless under
both Chapman and Kotteakos, the court may have engaged in
a far more stringent examination of the effect of the error
than it would have if it had applied the harmless error test
formulated in Wold v. State.41
36. 76 Wis. 2d 499, 251 N.W.2d 800 (1977).
37. Id. at 509, 251 N.W.2d at 805.
38. Id. at 509-10, 251 N.W.2d at 805 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
39. See part II supra.
40. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
41. 57 Wis. 2d 344, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973).
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B. Sufficiency of the Properly Admitted Evidence: Wold v.
State
In Wold, which involved nonconstitutional error, the su-
preme court held that the trial court should have excluded
testimony of a state crime laboratory analyst concerning the
results of a test which, despite a motion for discovery, was not
disclosed to the defendant prior to trial.42 The court, holding
that this erroneous admission was harmless error, formulated
the following test: "The test of harmless error is not whether
some harm has resulted, but, rather, whether the appellate
court in its independent determination can conclude there is
sufficient evidence, other than and uninfluenced by the inad-
missible evidence, which would convict the defendant beyond
a reasonable doubt. ' '43 While purporting to examine the effect
of the error, the court examined the sufficiency of the un-
tainted evidence, stating that the effect of the error "must be
realistically evaluated in the context of the case."44 The court
applied the test it had postulated and concluded that the er-
ror was harmless: "Without the consideration of the labora-
tory test..., this evidence would be sufficient in the minds of
any jury to convict Wold beyond a reasonable doubt. We con-
clude from our independent consideration of the admissible
evidence that no reasonable jury considering only such evi-
dence could have acquitted Wold. ' '45
Although the Wold court addressed nonconstitutional er-
ror, it cited and discussed Fahy, Chapman and Harrington,
all of which dealt with constitutional error, as support for the
rule it formulated. 46 This seeming indifference to the constitu-
tional/nonconstitutional error distinction was underscored
when the court applied the rule formulated in Wold to consti-
tutional error twice in the following year. In Allison v. State,47
42. Id. at 347-49, 204 N.W.2d at 487-90.
43. Id. at 356, 204 N.W.2d at 490.
44. Id. at 357, 204 N.W.2d at 491.
45. Id. at 358, 204 N.W.2d at 491.
46. Interestingly enough, although formulating a rule weighing the sufficiency of
the remaining, untainted evidence, the Wold court synthesized the applicable federal
rule after Harrington to be that an error cannot be deemed harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt where there is a reasonable probability that the evidence complained
of might have contributed to the conviction. 57 Wis. 2d at 356 n.12, 204 N.W.2d at
490.
47. 62 Wis. 2d 14, 214 N.W.2d 437 (1974).
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the exclusion of defendant's alibi evidence was held to be con-
stitutional error implicating the defendant's sixth amendment
right to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
but it was held harmless under the Allison court's somewhat
distorted restatement of Wold: "[E]rror is harmless unless the
result would reasonably have been different .... ."" In Scales
v. State,'4 1 admission of a statement in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona,50 "though of constitutional dimensions,""1 was held
to be harmless error. Indicating that Wold had accepted the
harmless error test of Harrington, the Scales court applied
the Wold rule: Whether there was "sufficient evidence, other
than and uninfluenced by the inadmissable evidence, which
would convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
'52
C. Challenge to the Wold Rule: Kelly v. State
After similar application of the Wold rule to a case involv-
ing nonconstitutional error,53 the majority's application of the
Wold rule to constitutional error was challenged in Kelly v.
State." After determining that the evidence complained of
should have been excluded as fruit of an illegal search in con-
travention of the fourth amendment, the majority restated the
Wold rule and refused to reverse the conviction:
[W]e find that the admission of this evidence constituted
harmless error in this case. We conclude from examination
of this record that the evidence of the defendant's guilt was
such that without this evidence and uninfluenced by it that
the admissible evidence was such as would allow the jury to
48. Id. at 29, 214 N.W.2d at 445.-See also Rohl v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 682, 233
N.W.2d 567 (1974).
49. 64 Wis. 2d 485, 219 N.W.2d 286 (1974).
50. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
51. 64 Wis. 2d at 492, 219 N.W.2d at 291.
52. Id. (quoting Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 356, 204 N.W.2d 482, 490 (1973)).
53. State v. Dean, 67 Wis. 2d 513, 227 N.W.2d 712 (1975). In Dean, the court was
faced with testimony admitted at trial which "was clearly inadmissible hearsay and
should have been excluded." Id. at 532, 227 N.W.2d at 721. The court quoted the test
promulgated in Wold, considered the inadmissible evidence untainted by the error,
and concluded that the error was harmless: "While this testimony ... was improp-
erly admitted . .. , it was merely cumulative to evidence that was ultimately
presented by the prosecution which covered the same points. We conclude that be-
cause of other evidence offered in the trial that the receipt of this testimony consti-
tuted harmless error." Id. at 533, 227 N.W.2d at 721.
54. 75 Wis. 2d 303, 249 N.W.2d 800 (1977).
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convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.... We
conclude in our independent determination that the other
evidence uninfluenced by the inadmissible evidence is suffi-
cient to convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.55
In a concurring opinion,56 Justice Heffernan advocated re-
consideration of the Wold rule because of its "obvious over-
breadth" and misplacement of emphasis:
This writer doubts the correctness of the formulation of
the harmless error rule in Wold relied upon in the majority
opinion. Under that rule no error can be prejudicial if the
evidence properly admitted is highly probative of guilt. This
is an invitation for prosecutorial abuse. There is always a
temptation for a prosecutor to make a good case better by
urging admission of dubious or improper evidence. The
Wold rule gives no recourse against errors which may well
have a substantial impact upon the jury's finding of guilt.
The philosophy of Wold is simply that a person who may
properly be found guilty under admissible evidence cannot
be deprived of a fair trial because of error, even though that
error contributes substantially to the finding of guilt. Wold,
erroneously I believe, places the emphasis upon the admissi-
ble evidence rather than upon the alleged error. Attention
should be focused on whether the error prejudices the rights
of the defendant.
When Agurs refers to the usual harmless error rule as
being such that, ". . . when error is present in the record,
the reviewing judge must set aside the verdict and judgment
unless his 'conviction is sure that the error did not influence
the jury, or had but only slight effect' . . . " it is clear that
the United States Supreme Court speaks of a rule different
than that adopted in Wold 5 7
The court has subsequently stated that, notwithstanding
Justice Heffernan's challenge, "[t]he present harmless error
rule in this state is set forth in Wold v. State .. ."58 While
55. Id. at 316-17, 249 N.W.2d at 807 (citation and footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 321, 249 N.W.2d at 809 (Heffernan, J., concurring). Justice Heffernan
stated that the error was harmless under his formulation of the harmless error rule as
well as under the Wold formulation. Id. at 322, 249 N.W.2d at 809.
57. Id. at 321, 249 N.W.2d at 809 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976)). As the court has so often done, Justice Heffernan
relied upon Kotteakos rather than Chapman in addressing constitutional error.
58. Thompson v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 134, 145, 265 N.W.2d 467, 472 (1978).
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the court has continued to apply the Wold rule to both consti-
tutional59 and nonconstitutional ° error without distinction, it
would appear that the continued vitality of a rule examining
only the sufficiency of the remaining evidence is uncertain.
Justice Heffernan's approach has gained the support of Jus-
tice Abrahamson who has advocated a reconsideration of the
Wold rule in three opinions written by her.6 1
D. Post-Wold Cases Holding Error Not Harmless
In Hart v. State,62 a nonconstitutional error case involving
admission of evidence which should have been excluded on
grounds of remoteness,"3 Justice Abrahamson, writing for the
court, noted that the Wold formulation of the harmless error
rule "is accepted for the purposes of this opinion. "64 The
court unanimously agreed that the error was not harmless
under Wold. The Wold test was not applied in the opinion,
however. The court considered the probable influence of the
improperly admitted evidence on the jury and concluded that
the defendant did not have a fair trial. 5
Justice Abrahamson again addressed the harmless error
test in State v. Spraggin,66 where the defendant had been
convicted of intentionally aiding and abetting in the delivery
of heroin. The trial judge had permitted the state to introduce
marijuana, weapons and stolen goods found in defendant's
home as "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts" appar-
ently "offered for . . . proof . . . of intent.61 7 Justice Abra-
59. See, e.g., Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 219 N.W.2d 286 (1974); Allison v.
State, 62 Wis. 2d 14, 214 N.W.2d 437 (1974).
60. See, e.g., State v. Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 280 N.W.2d 725 (1979); Simpson v.
State, 83 Wis. 2d 494, 266 N.W.2d 270 (1978); State v. Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 252
N.W.2d 94 (1977); State v. Jennaro, 76 Wis. 2d 499, 251 N.W.2d 800 (1977).
61. State v. Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 101 n.9, 252 N.W.2d 94, 100 (1977); Micale v.
State, 76 Wis. 2d 370, 373 n.2, 251 N.W.2d 458, 460 (1977); Hart v. State, 75 Wis. 2d
371, 395 n.11, 249 N.W.2d 810, 821 (1975).
62. 75 Wis. 2d 371, 249 N.W.2d 810 (1977).
63. Id. at 393, 249 N.W.2d at 820.
64. Id. at 395 n.11, 249 N.W.2d at 821.
65. Id. at 395, 249 N.W.2d at 820.
66. 77 Wis. 2d 89, 252 N.W.2d 94 (1977).
67. Wis. STAT. § 904.04(2) (1977) provides:
OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR AcTs. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence
when offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
1980]
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hamson, writing for a four-member majority, held that this vi-
olation of an evidentiary rule68 was not harmless error and
reversed the conviction. While mentioning that the admission
of the improper evidence was not harmless error under the
Wold rule, 9 the court did not examine the remaining, un-
tainted evidence to test its sufficiency to support the convic-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the court noted that
"[a] significant portion of the transcript sets forth evidence
we find inadmissible. '7 0 While such an observation may well
imply that the remaining evidence was insufficent under the
Wold rule, a contrary emphasis in testing for harmless error
came through clearly: "After careful reading of the record, we
believe that the presentation to the jury of the testimony and
physical evidence linking the defendant with marijuana, sto-
len goods and weapons, created a definite risk that the convic-
tion might be based on that evidence."' The dissent indi-
cated that the admission of the other-crimes evidence was
proper, but even if it had been error, it would have been
harmless error under Wold.72
In Schimmel v. State," the court held that the exclusion
of psychiatric evidence during the guilt phase of a bifurcated
first-degree murder trial was not harmless error under the
Wold rule. In reversing the conviction, however, the court
looked only to the nature of the evidence excluded, and did
not consider the admissible evidence in the record supporting
conviction."'
E. Post-Wold Cases Holding Error to be Harmless: The
"Under Any Test" Approach
While Justice Heffernan concurred in finding the error
harmless in Kelly v. State, he advocated a reconsideration of
the Wold rule because it "erroneously ... places the empha-
sis upon the admissible evidence rather than upon the alleged
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
68. Id.
69. 77 Wis. 2d at 101 n.9, 252 N.W.2d at 100.
70. Id. at 103, 252 N.W.2d at 100.
71. Id. at 101-02, 252 N.W.2d at 100.
72. Id. at 104, 252 N.W.2d at 101.
73. 84 Wis. 2d 287, 267 N.W.2d 271 (1978).
74. Id. at 302, 267 N.W.2d at 278.
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HARMLESS ERROR
error."7 5 Cases subsequent to Kelly holding error to be harm-
less appear to have minimized the controversy by emphasizing
that the error complained of was nonprejudicial "under any
test of harmless error. 78 In Simpson v. State," the court
cited Justice Heffernan's Kelly v. State concurrence in a foot-
note,78 and in the text held: "We conclude, applying either the
test adopted in Wold v. State or the test suggested in State v.
Jennaro that the error was not prejudicial. 7 9 A recent exam-
ple of this trend to determine that error is not prejudicial
under any test appears in State v. Sarinske:s0
The issue then is whether the error, if any, requires re-
versal. In the instant case we conclude that any error was
harmless whatever formulation of the harmless error rule is
used. Kelly v. State. We do not believe the error influenced
the jury or if it did the effect was slight. On the record, it
cannot reasonably be said that had the error not been com-
mitted, the verdict might probably have been different.
Wold v. State. In the framework of the instant case, there is
no significant possibility that the defendant would have
been found not guilty... in the absence of error.81
Thus, the tension continues between the Wold rule, man-
dating reversal only when the remaining, untainted, admissi-
ble evidence is found by the reviewing court to be insufficient
to support conviction; and the KotteakoslChapman rule,
mandating reversal unless the appellate court is convinced
that the error had at most a slight influence on the jury. Fur-
thermore, there is still no Wisconsin recognition of the Su-
preme Court's constitutional/nonconstitutional distinction. 2
75. 75 Wis. 2d 303, 321, 249 N.W.2d 800, 809 (1977).
76. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 87 Wis. 2d 804, 818, 275 N.W.2d 715, 722 (1979);
Lunde v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 80, 93, 270 N.W.2d 180, 186 (1978).
77. 83 Wis. 2d 494, 266 N.W.2d 270 (1978).
78. Id. at 507 n.1, 266 N.W.2d at 275.
79. Id. at 507, 266 N.W.2d at 275 (citations omitted).
80. 91 Wis. 2d 14, 280 N.W.2d 725 (1979).
81. Id. at 55, 280 N.W.2d at 743-44 (citations omitted).
82. See notes 59 and 60 supra. For an uncharacteristic recognition by the Wiscon-
sin court of the bifurcated approach to constitutional and nonconstitutional error, see
State v. Clark, 87 Wis. 2d 804, 818 & n.3, 275 N.W.2d 715, 722 (1979), where the court
criticized the defendant for invoking the Chapman standard in a case involving non-
constitutional error, and indicated that Wold was applicable to nonconstitutional er-
ror determinations. But see Sheehan v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 757, 767, 223 N.W.2d 600,
605 (1974), expressly rejecting the contention that Chapman rather than Wold
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Despite the court's insistence that the Wold test is the pre-
sent harmless error rule in Wisconsin, it has been misapplied
since Hart v. State and has not been applied in any case since
Kelly v. State where application of a different formulation of
harmless error would have yielded a different outcome.
Those cases in which reversal would have been mandated
under the more stringent "slight influence on the jury" test
also contained insufficient evidence to support conviction
under the "sufficient evidence for conviction" rule of Wold.
Concomitantly, those cases containing sufficient evidence to
trigger affirmance under the Wold harmless error rule have
coincidentally evidenced error which had at most a slight in-
fluence on the jury.
F. Moving Toward a Constitutional/Nonconstitutional
Distinction?
Finally, it should be noted that despite the court's indis-
criminate application of the Wold rule to both constitutional
and nonconstitutional error,83 some Wisconsin cases have ap-
proached constitutional error determinations without invoking
Wold. 4 In Reichhoff v. State,5 Justice Abrahamson, writing
for a four-member majority, formulated a test for determining
whether constitutional error was harmless. The court consid-
ered the frequency of the error, the nature of the state's evi-
dence against the defendant, and the nature of the defense."
The court determined that while the evidence in the case
before it against the defendant was sufficient to sustain the
conviction, the error occurred frequently and was highly prej-
should be applied to constitutional error.
83. See note 82 supra.
84. In Virgil v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 166, 267 N.W.2d 852 (1978), Justice Heffernan,
writing the majority opinion, applied the approach he had advocated in Kelly v.
State as part of a plain error determination under Wis. STAT. § 901.03(4), and man-
dated reversal. After examining the evidence untainted by the erroneously admitted
evidence, the court stated:
We do not conclude that such evidence would have been insufficient to convict
were it viewed alone, but it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the
[inadmissible] testimony .... which was put into evidence contrary to the
salutory provisions of the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions, did not
play a part in impelling the jury's verdict.
Id. at 192, 267 N.W.2d at 865.
85. 76 Wis. 2d 375, 251 N.W.2d 470 (1977).
86. Id. at 381, 251 N.W.2d at 473.
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udicial to the defense employed. The court therefore man-
dated a new trial. 7 The dissent in Reichhoff believed there
was no prejudicial error under what it considered to be the
correct test: "This court has held that errors occurring in the
course of a trial will not serve to overturn a conviction unless
it clearly appears that had they not occurred, the result would
probably have been more favorable to the defendant."88
In Rudolph v. State,89 the court, in a per curiam opinion,
relied on both Reichhoff and Chapman in determining
whether the constitutional error before it was harmless:
The recent case of Reichhoff v. State is instructive for the
conceptual framework it provides for harmless error analy-
sis. The test of whether constitutional error is harmless, as
that test was formulated in Chapman v. California, and as it
was applied in Reichhoff, requires that the beneficiary of the
constitutional error, here the state ". . prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the error complained of did not contrib-
ute to the verdict obtained." As recognized in Reichhoff, the
relevant factors considered when determining whether a
constitutional error is harmless include (1) the frequency of
the error, (2) the nature of the state's evidence against the
defendant, and (3) the nature of the defense.90
The court then found the error to be harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, noting that the state's evidence was "amply
sufficient to support the conviction," '91 that the error had not
been as repeated or blatant as in Reichhoff,92 that a caution-
ary explanation had been given to the jury at the time of er-
ror,93 and that a cautionary instruction could have been re-
quested by defense counsel." A three-member dissent noted
the weakness of the state's evidence and the high likelihood of
prejudice in the error complained of. Quoting Schneble,95 the
dissent stated that the error should not have been found
harmless because "there is a reasonable possibility that the
87. Id. at 381-82, 251 N.W.2d at 473-74.
88. Id. at 384, 251 N.W.2d at 475.
89. 78 Wis. 2d 435, 254 N.W.2d 471 (1977).
90. Id. at 443, 254 N.W.2d at 474-75 (citation omitted).
91. Id. at 444, 254 N.W.2d at 475.
92. Id. at 445, 254 N.W.2d at 475.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 446-47, 254 N.W.2d at 476.
95. 405 U.S. 427, 432 (1972).
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improperly admitted evidence contributed to (defendant's)
conviction."96
IV. MAKING SENSE OUT OF THE WISCONSIN APPROACH
One thing that emerges from the picture painted by these
cases is that, almost without exception,97 the Wisconsin court
has ignored the Supreme Court's approach which binds states
by the United States Constitution in determining the effect of
constitutional harmless error, but which leaves the states free
to formulate their own rules for nonconstitutional error. In
this respect the Wisconsin approach avoids the criticism of
those who label the constitutional distinction an artificial
oneY8 It has been argued that a defendant's right to a fair
trial can be prejudiced as easily by nonconstitutional errors as
by constitutional errors,99 and that the impact of the error
complained of, rather than the label attached to the error,
should primarily concern an appellate court.100 As an example,
one commentator points out that the effect of an erroneously
admitted hearsay statement upon the jury is the same
whether the court views the error as a violation of sixth
amendment confrontation rights or state hearsay rules, but
under the bifurcated approach, resolution of the primary in-
quiry as to the nature of the error determines which harmless
error standard will be applied.10 1
Another laudable aspect of this indiscriminate approach is
that, although required to do so only in cases involving consti-
96. 78 Wis. 2d at 449, 254 N.W.2d at 475-76 (Day, J., dissenting) (quoting 405
U.S. at 432).
97. See State v. Clark, 87 Wis. 2d 804, 818, 275 N.W.2d 715, 722 (1979) and note
82 supra.
98. See, e.g., Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 94 (1963), where Justice Harlan,
dissenting, said: "It is obvious that there is no necessary connection between the fact
that evidence was unconstitutionally seized and the degree of harm caused by its
admission." See also Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REv. 988,
1025 (1973); Note, People v. Crimmins: The New Prejudice Rule, 40 ALB. L. REV.
405, 419 (1976).
99. See, e.g., People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 247, 326 N.E.2d 787, 797, 367
N.Y.S.2d 213, 226 (1975) (dissenting opinion).
100. See Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988, 1025 (1973);
Note, People v. Crimmins: The New Prejudice Rule, 40 ALB. L. REV. 405, 419 (1976).




tutional error,10 2 the Wisconsin court finds harmless error be-
yond a reasonable doubt in reviewing all criminal convictions,
an approach advocated in light of In re Winship's03 require-
ment that all criminal convictions must be based upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.1
It cannot be ignored, however, that while a state is free to
adopt a uniform approach to constitutional and nonconstitu-
tional harmless error determinations, such an approach must
meet the United States Supreme Court's standard for deter-
mining the effect of constitutional error.10' Thus, the uniform
harmless error rule emerging from the Wold line of cases must
be compared to the rule of Chapman and its progeny.
A. Wold and Constitutional Error
Under the Wold test of harmless error, the court examines
the remaining, untainted evidence to determine whether it is
sufficient to support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt
without assessing the probable effect of the error complained
of on the jury's deliberations. As has been discussed,10 6 Chap-
man's contrary emphasis on the effect of the error appears to
have been eroded by Harrington, Schneble, Brown and
Parker. However, the Supreme Court's "overwhelming evi-
dence" test emerging from these later cases' °7 appears to be
far more stringent than Wold's "sufficient evidence" test.108
Furthermore, in Schneble, the Court restated, even if it did
not apply, the original Chapman test that constitutional error
is not harmless where "there is a reasonable possibility that
the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the defen-
dant's conviction."109 Thus, it appears that the current test
102. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). See text accompanying note
18 supra.
103. 397 U.S. 358 (1970); See also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
104. See Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A
Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. Rlv. 15, 18 (1976); Saltzburg, The
Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. Rav. 988 (1973), which suggests that "[o]ne impli-
cation of a specific constitutional standard of proof at a criminal trial is that appel-
late review of evidentiary errors must be performed in a manner which does not sub-
vert that standard." Id. at 989.
105. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967).
106. See text accompanying notes 23-33 supra.
107. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
108. See note 126 infra.
109. 405 U.S. 427, 432 (1972).
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for constitutional error, binding on the states, is that such er-
ror will be found not harmless if there is a reasonable possibil-
ity that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the
conviction, unless the evidence supporting conviction is
overwhelming.
When compared to this standard, it is readily apparent
that the Wold test is not sufficiently stringent for determining
the effect of constitutional error, and that by indiscriminately
applying it to both constitutional and nonconstitutional error,
the Wisconsin court is ignoring the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement in Chapman that state harmless error rules are
inapplicable to federal constitutional error.110
Justice Heffernan's challenge to Wold, while arising in a
case involving constitutional error,"1 did not recognize this
most serious misapplication of the Wold test. Instead, his
challenge invoked the nonbinding Kotteakos rule formulated
for determining nonconstitutional error in the federal courts,
which has been renewed indiscriminately in both constitu-
tional and nonconstitutional harmless error cases.112 Thus far,
only one Wisconsin decision, State v. Clark,"3 has recognized
the United States Supreme Court's distinct approach for state
determinations of constitutional and nonconstitutional harm-
less error. In Clark, the court invoked the Wold rule for deter-
mining the effect of the nonconstitutional error which had oc-
curred"14 and cited Chapman as the proper test for evaluating
constitutional error. 15
B. Wold and Nonconstitutional Error
While Wisconsin is free to formulate its own harmless er-
ror doctrine applicable to nonconstitutional error, the "suffi-
cient evidence" test formulated in Wold and challenged by
Justice Heffernan should be examined as applied to noncon-
110. 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967). Note that the non-Wold approach to constitutional
error advanced in Reichhoff v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 375, 251 N.W.2d 470 (1977), and
Rudolph v. State, 78 Wis. 2d 435, 254 N.W.2d 471 (1977), also fails to recognize the
"overwhelming evidence" standard of the Chapman progeny. See text accompanying
notes 85-94 supra.
111. Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 249 N.W.2d 800 (1977).
112. Id. at 321, 249 N.W.2d at 809.
113. 87 Wis. 2d 804, 275 N.W.2d 715 (1979).
114. Id. at 818, 275 N.W.2d at 722.
115. Id. at 818 n.3, 275 N.W.2d at 722.
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stitutional error, keeping in mind the delicate balance be-
tween ensuring a fair trial to criminal defendants and the ju-
dicial economy goal of preventing reversals based upon
technical and trivial errors.11 6 Taken most favorably, the
Wold test is a model of judicial economy which does not deny
the criminal defendant a correct verdict. If, indeed, once the
error complained of has been excised from the record, the
court can conclude that there remains sufficient evidence to
convict the defendant, a new trial in which the same "suffi-
cient evidence" would be reintroduced would seem to be a
waste of time.
However, this emphasis on correct result not only ignores
whether the defendant received a fair trial the first time
around, but also assumes that the appellate court can and
should perform the required surgery on and weighing of the
evidence in the record. The assumption that an appellate
court has this ability has drawn severe criticism because the
appellate court is placed in the position of a jury which lacks
the benefit of having witnessed the trial.1 17 The criticism
places great emphasis on the inability of any appellate court
to make a satisfactory determination from an appeal record. 8
Regardless of the ability of the appellate court to carry out
this procedure, questions as to the propriety of such action
cannot be easily ignored. Such questions are grounded in the
fear that the court is invading the province of the jury.119 Fur-
thermore, it may well be that the Wold test, as Justice Heifer-
nan asserted,1 20 is inadequate to deter prosecutorial miscon-
duct, recognized by many as an important function of
harmless error review.1 21
116. See, e.g., People v. Wander, 61 A.D.2d 1037, 403 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1978).
117. See, e.g., 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 681, 686-87 n.34 (1978).
118. R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 18-22 (1970).
119. See Note, Harmful Use of Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64 CORNELL L.
REv. 538, 542-43 (1979).
120. Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 321, 249 N.W.2d 800, 809 (1977) (concurring.
opinion).
121. United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 1314, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United
States v. Bell, 506 F.2d 207, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Jackson, 429 F.2d
1368, 1373 (7th Cir. 1970); Note, Harmful Use of Harmless Error in Criminal Cases,
64 CORNELL L. REv. 538, 544 (1979); Note, People v. Crimmins: The New Prejudice
Rule, 40 ALB. L. REv. 405, 420-21 (1976); Note, The Harmless Error Rule Reviewed,
47 COLUM. L. REv. 450, 459-61 (1947).
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This latter inadequacy could be dealt with in Wisconsin in
the manner suggested by the New York Court of Appeals in
People v. Crimmins. 22 In Crimmins, after formulating a rule
for determining nonconstitutional harmless error, the court
acknowledged that, despite a finding of harmlessness under
the applicable rule, an appellate court should in some cases of
prosecutorial misconduct reverse for "therapeutic pur-
poses. 1 23 Even so, the more fundamental objection of the im-
propriety and inability of an appellate court to second-guess
the factfinder is clearly applicable to Wold's "sufficient evi-
dence" test and not susceptible to cure by such special excep-
tions or rules.
These deficiencies in Wisconsin's approach to nonconstitu-
tional error could be solved by rejection of the Wold test,
which examines the remaining, untainted evidence without di-
rectly considering the effect of the error on the jury's delibera-
tions, but also without adoption of the Kotteakos test,124
which examines the effect of the error on the jury's delibera-
tions without focusing on the quantum of the remaining, un-
tainted evidence. Instead, the court could adopt for determin-
ing nonconstitutional harmless error the current rule
applicable to constitutional harmless error determinations:
trial error will be found not harmless if there is a reasonable
possibility that it contributed to the conviction, unless the re-
maining, untainted evidence overwhelmingly supports the
conviction.125 This test, with its primary emphasis on deter-
mining the harmfulness of the error, is in keeping with a de-
fendant's right to a fair trial and addresses the prosecutorial
misconduct problem. At the same time, the "overwhelming
evidence" consideration promotes judicial economy without
the same degree of second-guessing endemic to the Wold "suf-
ficient evidence" test.12 By adopting such an approach to
122. 36 N.Y.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 787, 367 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1975).
123. Id. at 240 n.*. 326 N.E.2d at 793, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 221. Cf. Note, People v.
Crimmins: The New Prejudice Rule, 40 ALB. L. REv. 405, 421 (1976) (reviewing post-
Crimmins New York case law and concluding that the cases have not given a clear
rule for determining whether prosecutorial misconduct is severe enough for reversal).
124. As advocated by Justices Heffernan and Abrahamson. See note 61 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 106-110 supra.
126. Note, however, that the same criticism directed at the Wold "sufficient evi-
dence" test, see text accompanying notes 117-119, has been directed at the Supreme
Court's "overwhelming evidence" test for constitutional harmless error determina-
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nonconstitutional harmless error,12 Wisconsin would not only
avoid the problems inherent in its Wold approach, but would
also continue to follow its own traditionally uniform treat-
ment of constitutional and nonconstitutional harmless error in
criminal convictions.' 2 8
V. CONCLUSION
Both the Wisconsin majority and minority approaches to
harmless error determinations are marked by confusion and
an alarming disregard for the dictates and guidance of the
United States Supreme Court. Wisconsin has failed to heed
the pronouncement in Chapman v. California that state
harmless error rules are inapplicable to federal constitutional
harmless error unless the state rule satisfies the federal stan-
dard for constitutional error. When the Supreme Court's con-
stitutional harmless error rule has been noted in Wisconsin
decisions, its evolution since Chapman has been ignored. In
light of the historic certainty that Wisconsin's nonconstitu-
tional harmless error rule will be invoked in cases involving
constitutional error, and recognizing the deficiencies inherent
in the Wold rule, Wisconsin's confused approach to harmless
error should be jettisoned in favor of the following harmless
error rule, applicable to both constitutional and nonconstitu-
tional error: error will be found not harmless if there is a rea-
sonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction ap-
pealed from, unless the untainted evidence remaining in the
record after the error is excised overwhelmingly supports the
conviction.
KENT A. TESS-MATTNER
tions. See, e.g., 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 681, 686 n.34 (1978).
127. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
128. See text accompanying notes 97-104 supra.
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